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Abstract
If productivity increases more slowly for services than for manufactured goods
then services suﬀer from Baumol’s cost disease and tend to become relatively more
costly over time. Since the welfare state in all countries is an important supplier
of tax financed services, this translates into a financial pressure which seems to
leave policymakers with a trilemma; increase taxes (and hence tax distortions), cut
spending or redistribute less. Under the assumptions underlying Baumol’s cost
disease, we show that these dismal implications are not warranted. The welfare
state is sustainable and Baumol growth leaves scope for Pareto improvements.
∗We are grateful to Peter Birch Sørensen for comments on an earlier draft. Contact info:
ctk@econ.ku.dk (Claus T. Kreiner) and tandersen@econ.au.dk (Torben M. Andersen).
An economic specter haunts the democratic governments of the world’s
most prosperous economies. The rising cost of health care and education
casts a shadow over virtually any election......ever more of gross national
product will have to be channeled through the public sector, with all the
problems we know that to entail (Baumol, 1993, p. 17).
1 Introduction
This paper analyses implications of Baumol’s cost disease for the sustainability of the
welfare state. Baumol (1967) raised the issue of how society would develop if there are
ongoing productivity increases in the production of manufactured commodities and no
(or lower) productivity increases in the production of services.1 If wage increases are
the same across sectors, it follows that the cost or price of services increases relative
to manufactured commodities. A mechanism known as Baumol’s cost disease. Baumol
predicted an ever declining employment level in manufacturing, increasing employment
in the service sector, and eventually a stagnant economy. Although the Baumol cost
disease applies to services in general, and not whether they are provided by the private
or the public sector, a number of authors have pointed to the particular diﬃculties it
raises for tax financed service provision. Baumol (1993) predicts that an ever increasing
share of the gross domestic product will be absorbed by the public sector, and thus
eventually lead to a tax rate in conflict with the Laﬀer bound. Similar arguments are
made in e.g. Lindbeck (2006) and van der Ploeg (2007).
Empirical evidence confirms Baumol’s productivity assumption and the implied
structural changes. Empirical analyses show that services in general tend to have lower
productivity growth than other goods and therefore service prices tend to grow faster,
see e.g. Nordhaus (2008). Structural changes leading to a declining employment share
in manufacturing sectors (in a broad sense including both primary and secondary sec-
tors) and increasing employment shares in private and public services are observed for
all OECD countries. It is also noteworthy that assessments of fiscal sustainability com-
monly point to Baumol’s cost disease as an important expenditure driver, see e.g. IMF
1See also Baumol and Bowen (1966), Baumol (1993) and Baumol et al. (2012).
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(2012) and European Commission (2013) as well as a long list of specific country studies
including Bates and Santerre (2013) on the US, Oﬃce of Budget Responsibility (2013)
on the UK, New Zealand Treasury (2012) on New Zealand, DREAM (2014) on Denmark,
and Regeringen (2013) on Sweden.
The implications of Baumol’s cost disease seem to be dismal, stagnating economies
and unsustainable public sectors. The stagnation implication has been reputed. Even
accepting the premise of diﬀerences in productivity growth between manufactured goods
and services as well as increasing employment shares in services, it does not necessarily
follow that economies will stagnate. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) show that both facts
are consistent with ongoing growth when accounting for capital goods needed in both
manufacturing and service production.
We consider the implications of Baumol cost disease for the public sector or the
welfare state in more general terms. We interpret the welfare state broadly in the sense
of tax financed provision of services (including education, health and care) as well as
redistribution. All OECD countries have welfare states although obviously the size and
structure diﬀer. If the relative costs of producing publicly provided services grow over
time, it seems to bring the welfare state into a financial squeeze leaving a trilemma for
policy makers; increase taxes (at the cost of increasing tax distortions), cut spending
on services or redistribute less. The latter two choices amount to a retrenchment of the
welfare state, which may seem unavoidable because the tax-income ratio has an upper
limit (the Laﬀer rate).
We ask whether the welfare state is sustainable in the sense that the same principles
for public provision of services can be maintained, and the same distribution of well-
being/utility can be attained without comprising public finances. We adopt the original
Baumol assumptions on productivity growth and consider the implications for the wel-
fare state under rather general assumptions on individual preferences and the social
welfare function. The results of our analysis show that the welfare state is sustainable
and, moreover, that Baumol growth leaves room for Pareto improvements.
This result is related to recent work showing that the marginal cost of public funds
and the eﬃciency loss from taxation may be exaggerated when taking marginal tax
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rates at face value and, more generally, pointing to the virtues of generous welfare
states, e.g. Blomquist et al. (2010), Kreiner and Verdelin (2012), Jacobs (2013), Jacobs
and de Mooij (2014), Barth et al. (2014) and Kleven (2014). In the case considered
here, Baumol growth increases the cost of public services and therefore government
expenditures but it also changes household income and thereby tax revenue and demand
for public services. The eﬀects on household welfare vary across households with diﬀerent
income levels. By using benefit oﬀ-setting income taxation (related to the use of the
benefit principle or Lindahl pricing in public good provision), we show it is possible to
keep utility unchanged at all income levels and increase tax payments without impeding
economic eﬃciency. The increase in tax revenue is always larger than the increase in
government expenditures thereby leaving room for Pareto improvements.
The paper is organized as follows: The model featuring Baumol growth and a public
sector engaged both in public provision of services and redistribution is set up in Section
2. Sustainability of the welfare state and the basic result on the eﬀect of Baumol growth
are provided in Section 3, while Section 4 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 A model of Baumol growth and public policies
The welfare state provides welfare services and redistributes. To capture both elements
we formulate a model in which agents derive utility from a tax-financed public good
or service and have diﬀerent earnings ability giving a motive for redistribution. Ability
levels are unobservable by the policy maker, which leads to a classical equity-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ. We consider a two-goods economy with a private good (labelled manufactured
good) and a public good/service (labelled service).2 The productivity may increase for
both types of production, but our main focus will be on the case of Baumol growth
where productivity increases more in the production of manufactures than in service
production.
2Since the population size is constant, the public activity may be interpreted as either a collective
good or an individualized service like health, care or education.
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2.1 Firms
The technologies available for production of manufactures () and services () are
given as
 =   (1)
 =  (2)
where  denotes eﬀective input of labour while  ( =) captures productivity.
We normalize the price of the manufacturing good to one, and let  denote the price
on the service relative to the manufacturing good. The cost per unit of eﬀective labour
is denoted  (measured in units of the numeraire good), and assuming that labour is
completely mobile between the two sectors implies a uniform wage across the sectors.
The first-order conditions for the profit maximization problem of firms become3
 =  =   (3)

 =  =  (4)
We consider exogenous technological progress:
 =  
 = 
where Baumol growth is present whenever    ≥ 0. From (3) and (4), we have
 =  ⇒  =  −   0 (5)
showing that the Baumol eﬀect makes the service more expensive relative to the man-
ufactured good.
From eqs. (1), (2) and (5), we also have

 =

 =

 
showing that the service sector uses a larger fraction of labour if the value of service
output increases as a fraction of GDP.4
3Note that with perfect competition and constant returns there is no diﬀerence between a situation
where the public sector acquires services in the market or is the producer of the service.
4The Baumol eﬀect does not necessarily raise the fraction of income used on public services. This
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2.2 Households
We consider a continuum of households which diﬀer only with respect to abilities  ∈
[ ]. Ability levels are fixed and distributed according to the density function  ()
where () ≥ 0 and R  () = 1. The eﬀective labour input per hour of a type 
individual is equal to , implying that the wage per hour becomes
 () =  ·  =  =  (6)
where we have used eqs. (3) and (4). Notice that technological progress does not influ-
ence the gross wage diﬀerential between diﬀerent types of labour, i.e.  (0)  (00) =
000 is independent of  and  for all 0 and 00. Thus, Baumol growth does not
aﬀect the distribution of relative wages (we do not want to mix up the eﬀects of Baumol
growth with the eﬀects of skill-biased technological change).
The households have identical preferences represented by the utility function
 =  (  )  (7)
where  denotes private consumption of the manufactured good,  is consumption of
services supplied by the government, and  is hours-of-work. The utility function is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable,   0,   0,   0, and the usual concavity and limit
properties apply. The budget constraint of an individual equals
 ≤ −  ()  (8)
where  ≡  denotes gross earnings (cf. eq. (6)), while  () is a non-linear tax
function defined over earnings. From eqs. (7), (8) and  =  (), we get
 (  ) ≡ −  (−  ()   ) (−  ()   )
1
  0 (9)
 (  ) ≡  (−  ()   ) (−  ()   )  0 (10)
which measures the marginal rate of substitution between, respectively,  and  and
 and  for a type  individual at the earnings level . A household of type  chooses
requires that the elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods in household demand is
below one, cf. also Ngai and Pissarides (2007). We consider a general preference specification and do
therefore not impose any restriction on the elasticity of substitution.
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the earnings level  () (or, equivalently,  ()) and the consumption of manufacturing
goods  () that maximize (7) subject to (8), for a given level of public services . The
first-order condition gives
 [ ()   ] = 1− ( ()) (11)
where ( ()) ≡  ( ())  is the marginal tax rate at the income level  (). We
follow the standard approach in optimal income taxation and contract theory and assume
that the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition is satisfied (e.g. Salanié, 2003):
 (  )   0. (12)
This assumption ensures that the tax system is implementable; i.e., that higher ability
individuals always choose higher equilibrium earnings, implying that the government
can use income as a signal of the underlying ability.
The indirect utility function of individual  when consumption of the manufactured
good and labour supply are chosen optimally is defined as
 () ≡ 
µ
 ()−  ( ())    ()
¶
 (13)
which also implies
 () = − (·)  ()2  0 (14)
where we have used the Envelope Theorem.
2.3 Market equilibrium
Market clearing in the factor market and in the market for the private good implies
 +  =
Z ¯

 ()  ()   =
Z ¯

 ()  () 
2.4 Welfare state/government
The government decides the level of public service  =  and the non-linear tax function
 (·), and thereby also the degree of redistribution. Since the government cannot observe
ability levels, taxes and transfers depend on observable income, and redistribution of
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income therefore generates an eﬃciency loss. Note that  (·) may be negative at certain
income levels, reflecting that households at these income levels receive net-transfers.
The policy choice of the government has to obey the budget constraint
 ≡
Z ¯

 ( ())  () −  ·  ≥ 0 (15)
We consider a benevolent government having a social welfare function defined over
individual utilities. Our result is general in the sense that we want to show that the
welfare state is sustainable under Baumol growth for a large class of social welfare func-
tions determining the level of public service provision and the extent of redistribution.
We therefore only impose the mild condition that the policy choice of the government
satisfies the Pareto Criterion; i.e., it is impossible to suggest another combination of 
and  (·) which would generate a Pareto improvement. Using the Pareto Criterion, it is
possible to show that an optimal level of public service satisfies (see Appendix A)Z ¯

∙
 ( ()   ) +  ( ())  (  )  (  ) 
¸
 ()  =  (16)
which is the modified Samuelson rule that has been derived elsewhere in the Public
Finance literature, e.g. Kreiner and Verdelin (2012). The RHS is the marginal rate of
transformation of the manufactured good into the public service and the first term in
the bracket on the LHS is the aggregate willingness to pay for the public good. These
two terms alone constitute the original Samuelson rule, while the second term in the
bracket stems from the incomplete information of the government concerning ability
levels that give rise to tax distortions.5
3 Sustainability of the welfare state
In our inquiry into the sustainability of the welfare state, we study whether Baumol
growth, after an appropriate adjustment of tax and public expenditure policy, enables
a Pareto improvement or, alternatively, that a Pareto worsening is unavoidable. For
5The denominator in the second term is negative due to the single-crossing condition (12), and the
sign of the tax distortion eﬀect is therefore determined by MRS, which can be both positive and
negative. In the special case of weak separability, where  (  ) = ˜ ( ( )  ), the tax distortion
eﬀect is zero, and the original Samuelson rule applies, see e.g. Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and
Keen (1993).
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this agenda to make sense, we assume that the initial equilibrium is Pareto optimal
implying the public service consumption satisfies the modified Samuelson rule (16).
Thus, we define the welfare state to be sustainable under Baumol growth if it is possible
to satisfy the demand for the public service according to the modified Samuelson rule
and at the same time maintain an unchanged distributional profile of utility without
violating the government budget constraint. With this definition, we have
Proposition 1 (i) The welfare state is sustainable under Baumol growth; i.e., it is
possible to satisfy service demand according to the modified Samuelson rule (16) and
maintain an unchanged distribution of well-being () for all ability levels  without
violating the government budget constraint (15). (ii) It is always possible to obtain
Pareto improvements from Baumol growth.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The proof of the proposition shows that it is possible under Baumol growth to keep
everybody at their original utility level by an appropriate adjustment of the tax function,
to maintain a supply of welfare services in accordance with the modified Samuelson rule
(16), and at the same time obtain an increase in government revenue. Hence, the
viability of the welfare state is not at stake, and the policy makers obtain degrees of
freedom since the extra government revenue may, for example, be used to raise the well-
being of everybody through a lump sum grant (this may reduce government revenue
through an income eﬀect on labour supply, but this eﬀect would be of second order).
This would give a Pareto improvement without increasing any measure of the inequality
of well-being (on the contrary inequality would be reduced by most measures).
It is worth emphasizing that the above result is derived under reasonably weak as-
sumptions; e.g., we have not imposed any strong assumptions on individual preferences,
such as weak separability as often done in related literature, nor on the social welfare
function.
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4 Concluding remarks
Baumol growth or Baumol’s cost disease is widely perceived to lead the welfare state into
the trilemma of either having to increase taxes or make retrenchment of the welfare state
by cutting spending on services or redistribute less. In our analysis, this view turns out
to be wrong; it is possible to maintain principles for public provision of services and an
unchanged distributional profile of well-being. Actually, Baumol growth leaves degrees
of freedom by generating an increase in government revenue that creates scope for a
Pareto improvement.
Our analysis relies on the flexibility of non-linear income tax schemes, which makes
it possible to adjust tax payments at any income level to match changes in willingness
to pay for public service, i.e. the benefit principle may be applied. It may be argued
that this assumption–also underlying the Mirrleesian optimal income tax framework–
requires more flexibility in income taxation than what is actually possible, e.g. Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (2001). While we recognize there may be limits on the flexibility of the
tax system in practice, the point of our analysis is to show that Baumol growth does
not inevitably lead to unsustainability of the welfare state.
We have adopted a standard Mirrleesian type setting with homogenous preferences
and heterogeneity in innate abilities. A model with heterogeneity along both dimensions
would be considerably more complex. In such a setting, it would be impossible to derive
results based solely on the Pareto criteria because willingness-to-pay for public services
would diﬀer across households with the same level of income and therefore the same tax
payment.
Our second-best analysis includes distortions in labor supply and in the composition
of consumption between private sector goods and public sector goods. Both distortions
are related to the revenue side of the public sector and vanishes in the special case of a
perfectly inelastic labour supply. Another potential challenge may be on the expenditure
side of the public sector where the optimal allocation of resources may be hampered by
the lack of clear price signals, competitive pressure etc. implying a larger public sector
may be detrimental to economic eﬃciency, e.g. Sørensen (2015).
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A Derivation of equation (16)
Our derivation of the modified Samuelson rule follows the approach in Kreiner and
Verdelin (2012). We consider a small (marginal) increase in  and a change in the tax
function  (·) that keeps the utility level  () fixed at all ability levels . If such a change
raises government revenue, then it is possible to make a Pareto improvement, implying
that the initial level of  is socially suboptimal. If, on the other hand, government
revenue decreases, then a Pareto improvement can be achieved by decreasing . Hence,
if the level of public service is set optimally, a Pareto improvement is not possible.
From the government budget constraint (15), we have
 ≡
Z ¯

( ( ()) +  ( ())  ())  () −  ·  (A-1)
where  ( ()) is the mechanical change in tax burden at the income level  () while
 ( ())  () is the change in government revenue due to behavioural responses.
Unchanged utility at all ability levels implies from eqs. (13) and (14) that the change
in the allocation satisfies
 () = + + () = 0 (A-2)
 () = −
∙
+ + ()
¸ ()
2 − 
()
2 = 0 (A-3)
for all .6 By isolating  in the first of these equations and substituting the result into
the second equation, we obtain
() =
"  −  
  1 −  1 −  1
#
 (A-4)
From eqs. (9) and (10), we have
 (  )
 = −

2
∙
 −  
¸
 (  )
 = −

2
∙
 
1
 − 
1
 −


¸

By inserting these two derivatives in (A-4), we obtain
 () =  (  )  (  )  (A-5)
6These two conditions also ensure that the post-reform allocation is incentive compatible (see Kreiner
and Verdelin, 2012).
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The household budget constraint  = −  () implies that  = (1− ) −  ().
This expression and the first order condition (11) enable us to write condition (A-2) as
 ( ()) =  (·) (·) = (  ) ·  (A-6)
This equation shows that the increase in the tax burden of an individual with earnings
 is exactly equal to the extra benefit from the expansion of government consumption.
By inserting eqs. (A-5) and (A-6) into (A-1), we obtain

 =
Z ¯

µ
 ( ()  ) +  ( ())  (  )  (  ) 
¶
 () − 
If   0, then it is possible to make a Pareto improvement by increasing , and if
  0, then it is possible to make a Pareto improvement by reducing . Hence, a
Pareto optimum is characterized by  = 0, which gives the result in eq. (16).
B Proof of Proposition 1
We use a dual approach to prove the proposition. Technological progress raises wages
and changes the relative size of the public sector. To maintain an unchanged distri-
butional profile, we consider an adjustment in the non-linear income tax that keeps
everybody at the pre-change utility level. At the same time public provision should
satisfy (16). If the increase in tax revenue is larger than the extra costs on government-
provided services, then the government is able to fulfil all requirements in the definition
of sustainability. According to the dual approach, at every income level both the di-
rect change to the tax burden and the change in the marginal tax rate are determined
endogenously by the requirement that the utility of all individuals is unchanged (the
benefit principle), implying that  () and  () are fixed. Following a change in pro-
ductivity and a change in public service, we consider a change in the tax function  (·)
such that for all , we have  () = 0 and  () = 0. Using (13) and (14), these two
conditions give
 () = + +   −

 = 0 (B-7)
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 () = − 2− 

2− 

2 − 
 · 
23
+

2 + 
2
23 = 0 (B-8)
From (B-7), we get
 = 

 −





 −

 (B-9)
and from (B-8), we have
0 = −− −
∙
 +  
¸ 
 +
∙
 +  
¸
 
After substituting  from eq. (B-9) into this expression, we obtain
 =
 − 
 +  1 −  1
+  ·   (B-10)
From eqs. (9) and (10), we have
 (  )
 =

2
∙
  − 
¸

 (  )
 =

2
∙
 + 
1
 −


1

¸

By inserting these two derivatives in (B-10), we obtain
 =  (  )  (  ) +  ·   (B-11)
Insertion of this expression into (B-7) gives
 = − −


1

 (  ) 
 (  )  (B-12)
The household budget constraint (8) implies
 = (1− ) −  ()
where  () denotes the change in the total tax burden at the earnings level . After
using eqs. (B-11) and (B-12) to substitute for  and , we obtain
 () =
µ
1−  + 
1

¶  (·) 
 (·) + (1− )  ·  +


= (1− )  ·  +  (B-13)
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where the last equality follows from the optimum condition of the household (11). The
above expression measures the compensating increase in the tax burden of a type 
individual compared to the existing system; i.e., the benefit principle implies that the
tax function is adjusted to capture the benefits of individual  from a higher public
service and a higher productivity. If the net eﬀect on government revenue of the changes
in productivity and public service and the required change in taxation is positive, then
the welfare state is sustainable. In order to show that this is the case, we diﬀerentiate
the government revenue (15). This gives
 =
Z ¯

[ ( ()) + ( ()) ()]  () −  · −  · 
Using eqs. (5), (B-11) and (B-13), we obtain
 =
Z ¯

∙
 ·  + + ( ())


¸
 () − ( − ) −  · 
which, after using the modified Samuelson rule (16), becomes
 = 
Z ¯

 () − ( − )   0
where the inequality follows from the fact that
R ¯
  ()   . ¤
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